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COMMENTS
THE CRIMINALLY INSANE-AN APPEAL TO THE SANE
Fred Time
It has been said frequently that one of the most important re-
visions possible in Texas criminal jurisprudence would be a revision
of the current methods of determining insanity and caring for the
criminally insane. This Comment is designed to review the existing
law in the light of modern innovations in the field of mental dis-
orders in order to determine whether the present system is con-
ducive to justice in our society.
I. INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN TEXAS
The early history of our state courts indicates that an accused had,
upon making a timely demand that was supported by affidavit, a
right to have a jury trial in advance of the trial for his alleged offense.
The purpose of that trial was to determine whether a defendant was
mentally competent to make a rational defense This procedure has
been and is presently the law in Texas.! However, in earlier times sub-
mission of the issue of insanity at the time of the main trial was not
permitted, since the courts felt that confusion would arise if both
insanity as a defense to the substantive crime and present insanity
were submitted at the same trial.3 In 1937, though, article 932a of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in order to provide for
the submission of the issues of present insanity and insanity at the
time of the offense both during the main trial and at a preliminary
trial."
A finding of insanity at the time of the act has long been recog-
nized as a complete defense, and there can be no subsequent convic-
tion based upon such act.' However, a recent statute, passed in 1957,
goes even further.! The new act expressly states that a finding of
insanity at the time of the commission of the offense is more than
a mere defense: such a finding compels an immediate and complete
' Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 (1874).
'Prickett v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 395, 22 S.W.2d 136 (1929); Ray v. State, 110
Tex. Crim. 25, 7 S.W.2d 93 (1928); Ramirez v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 38, 241 S.W. 1020
(1922); Witty v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 125, 153 S.W. 1146 (1913).
aRamirez v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 236, 241 S.W. 1020 (1922).
4Texas Acts 1937, ch. 466, 30 G.L. 1172 (1935-1937).
5McGee v. State, 155 Tex. Grim. 639, 238 S.W.2d 707 (1951); Morrow v. State, 154
Tex. Crim. 21, 224 S.W.2d 481 (1949).
6 Tex, Pen, Code Ann. art. 34 (Supp. 1962).
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acquittal. The result is the same as though a jury has acquitted the
accused at a main trial; thus, one can be acquitted at the preliminary
trial though never really tried.7 Of course, if the jury finds the ac-
cused insane at the time of the trial, after having found him insane
at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the court must
enter an order committing the defendant to a mental hospital, and
he must remain confined until he becomes sane.' A defendant who
has been adjudged sane at a preliminary hearing is given the status
of a sane person, but he can, nevertheless, raise the defense of in-
sanity at the time of the commission of the act during the main trial.!
II. How To DETERMINE INSANITY IN TEXAS
How does a jury decide whether or not an accused is presently
insane or whether he was insane at the time the crime was com-
mitted? Texas continues to follow the test enunciated in the old
English case of Daniel M'Naghten handed down in 1843.10 In es-
sence, the rule is that in order to establish a defense of insanity, it
must be shown that the accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing or if he did know, that he did not
know he was doing wrong. It is commonly referred to as the "right
and wrong test," because the jury must decide if the mental impair-
ment was such as to deprive a person of the capacity and power to
distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act charged
as an offense.1'
Although an accused may be mentally ill according to medical
authority, under Texas law he may still be legally sane.1" The legal
test is not whether a defendant is of unsound mind or is mentally
ill. Rather, the question is whether his illness has rendered him in-
competent to make a rational defense and whether he is laboring
under such defect of reason from disease of mind as not to know
the nature or quality of his otherwise criminal act or if he does
know, whether he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong."
The jury has the insurmountable task of determining whether or
'Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 34 (Supp. 1962).
8 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 34 (Supp. 1962).
9Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 34 (Supp. 1962).
50M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
"1 Purcell v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 565, 322 S.W.2d 268 (1958); Freeman v. State, 166
Tex. Crim. 626, 317 S.W.2d 726 (1958); Hurst v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 378, 46 S.W.
635 (1898); Leache v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 279, 3 S.W. 539 (1886); Williams v. State,
7 Tex. Crim. 163 (1879); Webb v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. 596 (1879).
"Parson v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 387, 271 S.W.2d 643 (1954); McGee v. State, 155
Tex. Crim. 639, 238 S.W.2d 707 (1951).
'3Ex parte Hodges, 166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581 (1958).
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not the accused was mentally incompetent or insane at a particular
time in the past, namely, at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime. This precludes their right to find the accused insane
generally, i.e., at some time prior to the commission of the act or
insane only during certain seizures."
A good illustration of what a jury is instructed to determine is
the case of Freeman v. State."1 In that case the defendant was tried
for the murder of his seventeen year old girl friend. His defense was
insanity. Two psychiatrists testified that the defendant was suffering
from schizophrenia and expressed their opinions that he was insane
at the time of the commission of the offense as well as at the time
of the trial. A psychiatrist for the state testified that in his opinion
the accused, on the day of the homicide, had the mental capacity to
know the nature and consequences of his act and that he knew that
it was a wrong act. The jury was instructed that in order to establish
a defense on the ground of insanity it must be proved that at the
time of committing the act the party accused was laboring under
such defect of reason as not to know the difference between right
and wrong as to the particular act charged against him. This in-
struction precluded any possibility that a mind could be diseased at
different intervals such as in the case of schizophrenia."
The right and wrong test is also applied to partial," periodical,"
and temporary" insanity. The defense of insane delusions is sub-
ject to the same standard."° A person alleging that he was acting
under an insane delusion is judged as if the facts that he, in his
deluded state, believed to be true were actually true; he is relieved
only if those facts would justify or excuse his act had they actually
existed."
The doctrine of irresistible impulse is not recognized in Texas."
Uncontrollable passion or excitement which renders the mind in-
'"Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500 (1854); Erwin v. State, 10 Tex. Crim. 700 (1881);
Webb v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. 596 (1879).
'"Freeman v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 626, 317 S.W.2d 726 (1958).
18 Ibid.
"7Morris v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 63, 255 S.W. 744 (1923).
'8 Ibid.
'Dodd v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 160, 201 S.W. 1014 (1918); Evers v. State, 31 Tex.
Crim. 318, 20 S.W. 744 (1892).
" Alexander v. State, 8 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. 1928); Witty v. State, 69 Tex. Crim.
125, 153 S.W. 1146 (1913).
"1Alexander v. State, 8 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. 1928); Merritt v. State, 40 Tex. Crim.
359, 45 S.W. 21 (1898).
" Simpson v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 385, 291 S.W.2d 341 (1956); McCann v. State,




capable of cool reflection is not insanity." Mere mental weakness 4
or mental impairment 5 will not excuse a person from the conse-
quences of his criminal acts if he is able to distinguish between right
and wrong. The Texas Penal Code"8 states that neither intoxication
nor temporary insanity of the mind produced by the voluntary,
recent use of ardent spirits or intoxicants constitutes any excuse for
the commission of a criminal act. However, Texas decisions have
made an exception for the so-called forms of insanity known as
delirium tremens or mania a potu, which are generally caused by an
absence of liquor after prolonged use of it. Cases have gone so far
as to say that insanity of that nature is a complete defense." It has
also been held that involuntary drunkenness may be an excuse for
some unlawful acts.28 Article 36 of the Penal Code 9 declares that
temporary insanity produced by voluntary, recent use of ardent
spirits, intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or any combination of these
items may be introduced by the defendant to mitigate the penalty,
although this form of mental disorder is not a defense. However,
the cases are explicit in saying that mere intoxication is not enough.
The intoxication must be such that temporary insanity is advanced to
the stage that it deprives a person of the capacity and power to
know the difference between right and wrong."
III. DETERMINATION OF INSANITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Our Anglo-American law of insanity has progressed somewhat
from the early methods of determining legal insanity. In the be-
ginning the courts applied the "wild beast" test,' which gave an
accused a defense if at the time of the commission of the act he
were totally deprived of understanding. The theory was that he
could not know what he had done any more than a wild beast could
have known what it was doing. Next, the courts formulated a
standard which resulted in a defense of insanity if an accused did
not have the ordinary understanding of a fourteen year old child.3"
23 Swann v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 153, 242 S.W. 735 (1922).
24Mitchell v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. 37, 106 S.W. 124 (1907); Griffith v. State, 47 Tex.
Crim. 64, 78 S.W. 347 (1904).
25Parker v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 68, 238 S.W. 943 (1921).
28Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 36 (1961).
27 Mikeska v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 109, 182 S.W. 1127 (1915); Kelley v. State, 31 Tex.
Crim. 216, 20 S.W. 357 (1892).
2Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500 (1854); Colbath v. State, 4 Tex. Crim. 76 (1878).
29 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 36 (1952).
"°Thomas v. State, 40 Tex. 60 (1874); Butcher v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 169, 275
S.W.2d 672 (1955); Barnett v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 249, 162 S.W.2d 411 (1942).
"'Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724); Note, 43 Geo. L.J. 58 (1954).
"State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591 (1873).
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Still linked to the mother country, England, because of their
adoption of the English common law, most American jurisdictions
embraced the then newly enunciated test for insanity set forth by the
House of Lords in 1843 in M'Naghten's Case.3 Under that rule the
defendant had the burden of proving his defense of insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence." The M'Naghten rule has been
severely criticized as being anachronistic in the light of modern
psychiatry. On the other hand the M'Naghten test has been de-
fended on the ground that courts have liberally interpreted the re-
quirement of cognition thereby allowing a vast amount of psychiatric
testimony to be introduced in each trial." Regardless of the seemingly
endless criticism heaped upon the M'Naghten rule, it still prevails in
most American jurisdictions as the only test for insanity."
Isaac Ray, a recognized psychiatrist, as early as 1871 stated that
"it is [a] fundamental error of the courts to attempt a solution
through the use of general formulas without the aid of scientific
research and consultation."3 Ray recognized that there are forms of
mental illness in which behavior is so disordered and can be so detri-
mental to the patient, to others, or to both, that, in spite of seemingly
intact intellectual ability and the absence of delusion, the patient
seems to be the victim of emotional or moral forces beyond his con-
trol." Ray's contributions"' influenced not only the field of psy-
chiatry but apparently the Supreme Court of New Hampshire also.'
In State v. Jones4 that court stated that if the act of the defendant
was "the offspring or product of mental disease, the defendant would
not be guilty by reason of insanity." Surprisingly, the application
of this new standard had a short life, because no other cases involving
the defense of insanity arose in New Hampshire4 and few other
jurisdictions were influenced by it.
In 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
'"M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
"4Rex v. Carr-Briant, [1943] K.B. 607, 610; Sodeman v. Rex, [1936] 1 All E.R. 1138,
1140 (P.C.).
"Royal Commission Report On Capital Punishment 1949, at 113 (1953); Guttmacher,
The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 325, 326 (1955); Sobeloff,
Insanity and the Criminal Law-From M'Naghten to Durham and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J.
793 (1955).
3 Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the M'Naghten Rule, 42 A.B.A.J. 917,
988 (1956).
"
7 Model Penal Code § 4.01, at 161-62 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
"Ray, A Treatise On the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (5th ed. 1871).
a9 Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of
Mental Disease, 63 Yale L.J. 183 (1933).
40 Ibid.
41 State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
4150 N.H. 369 (1871).
4' Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 356-57 (1955).
[Vol. 17
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Columbia cast off the ancient M'Naghten rule by proclaiming a new
doctrine which reverberated throughout the legal world." The test set
forth simply declared that an accused was not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect. Al-
though that court did not define what would be considered a mental
"disease" or "defect," the same court has recently stated that mental
diseases would be those so recognized by the medical profession."
Under this test, the jury is required to determine whether or not
the type of abnormality alleged is a disease and if so, whether the
accused was actually suffering from that type of abnormality at
the time of the commission of the act.40 It is apparent that juries
will not be consistent in determining which different illnesses fit
within the broad definition of "disease" and "defect."W Also, in
order for a jury to determine that an accused is insane, they must
find that his act is ". . the product of such mental abnormality."'"
Both of the above requirements will cause conflicting results, because
different juries will hear a variety of opposing psychiatric testi-
mony.49 The important effect of this decision is that it leaves the
psychiatrist free to speak in the realm of psychiatric knowledge
rather than making him conform to preconceived legal standards.
The federal rule seems to be well stated in the Supreme Court
decision of Davis v. United States,5' in which the Court tacitly ap-
proved the test for insanity as being either incapacity to distinguish
between right and wrong with respect to the act, or, although able
to so distinguish, the inability to refrain from committing the
act. Although the federal court in the Durham case"1 rejected the
M'Naghten doctrine, several other federal jurisdictions have ex-
pressly spurned the Durham decision."
IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROPOSES A TEST FOR INSANITY
Dissatisfaction with the various tests enunciated by the numerous
courts in this country prompted the American Law Institute to
draft Model Penal Code provisions with a more practical approach
"Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
41Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).4 7 Model Penal Code § 4.01, at 159-60 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
48 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
40 Ibid.
50 16 5 U.S. 373 (1897).
" Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
" Voss v. United States, 259 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1958); Andersen v. United States, 237
F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1956).
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to the problem." The position taken seems to be a combination of
modern psychiatric theory with recognized legal standards. Both
the M'Naghten and Durham rules were rejected for a more medical-
legal viewpoint as to the defense and disposition of the criminally
insane.
The first section of the Model Code sets forth a determinative
standard which excludes responsibility." The effect of this section
is to inquire whether the accused was without capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law. The second paragraph
of that section is designed to exclude from the concept of mental
disease or defect the case of the so-called "psychopathic" personality.
The reason for this exclusion is that the psychopath differs from a
normal person only quantitatively or in degree, not qualitatively,
and the diagnosis of psychopathic personality does not carry with
it any explanation of the causes of the abnormality."
The Model Code provides a workable means of determining legal
responsibility. For the purpose of visualizing the applicability of the
Code provisions, assume that a defendant intends to rely on the
defense of insanity. First, he must file a notice in court that he
does intend to plead and prove that defense." The court is then re-
quired to appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or to request the
superintendent of a local hospital to designate at least one qualified
psychiatrist to report upon the mental condition of the defendant.
The court at its discretion may order the defendant committed to
a hospital or other suitable place for the purpose of the examination
for a period not exceeding sixty days, but if necessary, that period
can be extended. However, the defendant may hire a qualified psy-
chiatrist, and the defendant's psychiatrist shall be permitted to
witness and participate in the examination. 7 The examination is to
be conducted by any method employed and accepted by the medical
profession for the examination of those thought to be suffering
from mental disease or defect. "8 This provision allows the psychiatrist
the freedom to employ broad and liberal applications of newly dis-
covered methods of testing insanity. At the same time this section
of the Code seems to acknowledge tacitly the possibility of discover-
ing and recognizing newly found mental disorders. The report of
the examination includes a complete diagnosis of the patient and,
13Model Penal Code § 4.01, at 27-36 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
"1Id. at § 4.01.
"1Id. at § 4.01, at 160.
56id. at § 4.03(2).
5
7 id. at § 4.05(1).
'lid. at S 4.05(2).
[Vol. 17
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if the court requests, an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant
to have a particular state of mind which is an element of the offense
charged." The Code sets out a guide to assist the psychiatrist in
determining what to put in the report, although the criteria do not
seem to be restrictive."'
If a defendant is unwilling to participate in the examination, the
report shall so state and shall include an opinion, if possible, as to
whether such unwillingness of the defendant is the result of mental
disease or defect. This report is to be filed with the clerk of the
court who causes copies to be delivered to the district attorney and
to counsel for the defendant. Then, if the defendant contends that
he is unable to proceed because of present insanity, the court will
determine that question based upon the report of the examining
psychiatrists. However, if the finding is contested by either party,
the court holds a hearing to decide the question of present insanity.
If the psychiatric report is received into evidence, the party who
contests the finding has the right to summon and to cross-examine
the psychiatrists who joined in the making of the report." It should
be noted that this hearing is not a jury trial; therefore, if the court
determines that the defendant lacks the mental fitness to proceed, the
court will order him committed to the local commissioner of cor-
rection to be placed in an institution until he is considered medically
capable of standing trial. Anytime after the defendant is committed,
the district attorney or the commissioner of correction can request
a hearing to determine if the defendant has regained his sanity; if
it is so found, the proceeding against him will continue. However,
if the court determines that too much time has elapsed since the
defendant was committed, the court may dismiss the charge and
order the defendant committed to an appropriate institution for
the insane.""
If the defendant is found sane at the time of the trial at the pre-
liminary hearing, but the result of the psychiatric report is that he
was insane at the time of the criminal conduct, the court must enter
a judgment of acquittal."' However, the acquittal does not allow
the defendant to return to society in his present mental condition.
The finding of acquittal requires the court to order the defendant
to be committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction
59Id. at 5 4.05(3).
601d. at 5 4.05(3).
6IM. at 5 4.06(1).
"2Id. at 5 4.06(2).
63Id. at 5 4.07(1).
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to be placed in a mental institution for an indefinite period."' Once
committed, there are procedures available for a rehearing of his
present sanity. After having been confined for at least six months,
the defendant can apply for discharge or release to the court which
committed him. That court then appoints at least two qualified psy-
chiatrists to examine the defendant, and they report within sixty
days their opinions of his present mental condition. The court de-
termines, according to the psychiatric report, if the defendant may
be discharged or released on probation. If the court is not satisfied,
it must promptly order a hearing to determine whether the de-
fendant may be safely discharged or released. This hearing is deemed
a civil proceeding, and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
If the court decides that the defendant is able to live in society, it
can order a discharge on probation on such conditions as it may
determine."' After release, if the defendant violates his probation,
he will be ordered to return to a mental institution."6 When the
court finds against the defendant in the civil proceeding, he will
be ordered re-committed.7 Then the defendant cannot file an ap-
plication for another hearing until one year has elapsed from the
date of the preceding hearing. If the commissioner of corrections
determines that the defendant may be discharged on probation with-
out danger to himself or others, the commissioner makes applica-
tion in the same manner described above for the defendant."
The Model Code has many redeeming attributes. It provides for
competent medical determination of mental disorders. However, it
also provides for commitment in a mental institution on a finding
of acquittal on the grounds of insanity; this should be a deterrence
to the defendant who dishonestly claims insanity as a defense.
Finally, the Code acknowledges the possibility of a normal recovery
by providing for a rehearing after commitment.
V. REFORM: LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL?
If the bar in Texas wanted to revise its present standard for
determining criminal insanity, would it require legislative enactment
or could it be done judicially?
Texas adopted the M'Naghten standard as early as 1854.69 In
64Id. at § 4.08(1).
61 d. at § 4.08(3).
61id. at § 4.08(4).
67 Id. at § 4.08(3).
,8Id. at § 4.08(2).
09 Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500 (1854); Freeman v. State, 166 Tex. Crim. 626, 317
S.W.2d 726 (1958); McGee v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 639, 238 S.W.2d 707 (1951); Cosby
[Vol. 17
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1856 the Texas Legislature promulgated the statutory standard
which was to be applied in cases of insanity."0 After setting out the
defense of insanity in article 41"' of the Penal Code, the legislators
established the statutory methods for determining insanity in article
42." In these provisions lies the key to the possibility for change in
the present Texas law. Nowhere in any statutes" can it be found that
the M'Naghten standard of right and wrong must be used. Instead,
the statutes explicitly state that ". . . the rules of evidence known to
the common law as to the proof of insanity shall be observed in all
trials where that question is an issue." (Emphasis added.) Although
Texas adopted the English common law in regard to the test for
insanity, there is, obviously, no statutory restriction keeping the
Texas courts from developing their own common law rules in regard
to insanity. Therefore, only one Texas Supreme Court decision re-
jecting M'Naghten could develop an entire new common law con-
cept of insanity. Of course, the only other method of discarding the
ancient M'Naghten doctrine would be by legislative enactment.
VI. A PROPOSAL: A TEST FOR DETERMINING INSANITY
AND THE DISPOSITION OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE
The purposes for punishing a criminal are retribution, deterrence,
and reformation.4 In our modern, sophisticated society, retribution
is no longer considered morally justified; therefore, the important
considerations of society should be deterrence and reformation.
Because the human psyche is becoming more understood with the
v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 392, 220 S.W.2d 471 (1949); Ross v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 312,
220 S.W.2d 137 (1948); Stout v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 537, 155 S.W.2d 374 (1941);
Alexander v. State, 8 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. 1928); Newman v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 363,
269 S.W. 440 (1924); Craven v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 328, 247 S.W. 515 (1922); Parker
v. State, 91 Tex. Grim. 68, 238 S.W. 943 (1921); Maxey v. State, 66 Tex. Grim. 151, 145
S.W. 952 (1912); Kelley v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 151, 101 S.W.2d 230 (1907); Harrison
v. State, 44 Tex. Grim. 164, 69 S.W. 500 (1902).
7 Pen. Code of Texas art. 41 (1857).
71 Pen. Code of Texas art. 41 (1857):
No act done in a state of insanity can be punished as an offense. No person
who becomes insane after he committed an offense shall be tried for the same
while in such condition. No person who becomes insane after he is found
guilty shall be punished for the offense while in such condition.
7 Pen. Code of Texas art. 42 (1857):
The rules of evidence known to the common law in respect to the proof of
insanity, shall be observed in all trials where that question is in issue. The
manner of ascertaining whether the insanity is real or pretended, when it is
alleged that the defendant became insane after the commission of the offense
is prescribed in Part iii, Title viii, Chapter ii, of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. (Emphasis added.)
" Tex. Pen. Code (1925), and amendments; Tex. Pen. Code (1916); Tex. Pen. Code
(1911); Pen. Code of Texas (1857).
" Michael & Wechler, Criminal Law and Its Administration 6 (1940).
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attainment of systematic knowledge and the discovery of the phe-
nomena of the conscious and subconscious mental processes, pre-
viously unconsidered mental disorders are becoming recognized as
exclusions from social responsibility. Psychiatry has made tremendous
strides in the past century, and although there are divergent views
within that profession, it seems only logical to acknowledge that
the specialized science of mental disorder is better equipped to de-
termine insanity than twelve untrained laymen. Oliver Wendell
Holmes said: "An ideal system of law should draw its postulates and
its legislative justification from science. As it is now, we rely upon
tradition, or vague sentiment, or the fact that we never thought of
any other way of doing things, as our only warrant for rules which
we enforce with as much confidence as if they embodied revealed
wisdom."'" In the most malignant type of psychosis, schizophrenia,
the determination of whether a patient knows the nature and quality
of his act cannot accurately be stated by a categorical and unquali-
fied "yes" or "no."" Judges, lawyers, and jurors often fail to ap-
preciate the serious condition of such an individual, because on the
witness stand his mental processes are astute and often he is ex-
tremely persuasive.
What is the solution to this important social, legal, and medical
problem? Those who advocate the status quo say that a modern ap-
proach, such as the one proposed in the Model Penal Code, would
treat all criminals as mental patients and thereby eliminate any penal
sanctions. However, a practicable approach would not label all
criminals as mental patients, but it would and should openly accept
the fact that the criminal needs rehabilitation and that if psychiatry
can help him, it should be made available. Texas jurisprudence
should allow any and all defendants in a criminal case to be sub-
jected to an unbiased psychiatric examination. This examination
should be conducted by a group of psychiatrists unprejudiced as to
outcome. Let the psychiatrist, who is best trained, determine the
standard of responsibility in each case, rather than apply any non-
medical test such as the M'Naghten test or the Durham rule. Com-
mitment instead of acquittal upon a finding of insanity will result
in both equity to the criminally insane, deterrence to the feigning
criminal, and adequate protection for society.
"Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 138 (1920).
76 Guttmacher, Principal Difficulties With the Present Criteria of Responsibility and
Possible Alternatives, Model Penal Code 170 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
[Vol. 17
